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RECENT DECISIONS
is necessarily obiter dictum. The decision is noteworthy insofar as it
declines to follow the rule of In re Perkins'0 but rather lends judi-
cial weight to the precedent of Munz v. Harnett.17
M.F.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
-LICENSE FOR MASSAGE OPERATORS.-The plaintiffs, Jenny Worm-
sen and Dagmar Larsen-Bak, have applied for an order directing the
Commissioner of Licenses of New York City to accept their applica-
tions and to permit them to take the prescribed examination for mas-
sage operators. Plaintiffs allege that they filed proper applications
for licenses in November, 1940, and that these applications complied
with all the rules and regulations relating to such. On March 21,
1941, the applications were denied on the sole ground that the ap-
plicants had not been citizens of the United States for at least two
years.' When the applications were filed the Administrative Code
provided that the granting of licenses as massage operators is limited
to citizens or to those who have regularly declared their intention to
become citizens.2 Before the applications had been accepted, the Ad-
ministrative Code was amended to restrict the granting of licenses to
those who had been citizens two years.3 Petitioners urge that such
a provision is an arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory exercise
of police power, violative of the Constitution of the United States and
the State of New York.4 Held, application granted. Wormsen, et al.
v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 798 (1941).
A person's business or occupation is property within the consti-
tutional provisions as to due process of law. The guaranty of due
L. 1941, c. 872, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1942) which, no doubt, was influenced by the
decisions in the Reitz and Perkins cases.
16 3 F. Supp. 697 (N. D. N. Y. 1933).
17 6 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
I Petitioner Wormsen had acquired citizenship in February, 1941, and
petitioner Larsen-Bak had been examined for admission to citizenship in May,
1941, and was awaiting her final papers at the time of trial.
2 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 773a-1.0.
3 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § B32-195.0, as amended by Loc. Laws 1941, No.
15 and § 773a-1.0.
A U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1. "* * * nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
N. Y. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 6, 11. ""No person shall be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law." "No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof."5 Angelopoulos v. Battorff, 76 Cal. App. 621, 245 Pac. 447 (1926); Lasdon
v. Hallihan, 377 fII. 187, 36 N. E. (2d) 227 (1941) ; Bogni v. PerottL, 224 Mass.
152, 112 N. E. 853 (1916); Sinquefield v. Valentine, 159 Miss. 144, 132 So. 81
(1931).
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process, however, does not abridge the right of a state to exercise its
police power. The legislature has the power to license and regulate
certain vocations dependent upon a necessity to protect health, morals
or the general welfare of the state.0 Due to the fact that the very
nature of the profession of a massage operator requires contact with
the human body, it can be readily seen that such profession is prop-
erly subject to regulation under the police power. But in order to
be sustainable under the police power, the legislation must tend to
prevent some evil and the means selected must have a real relation
to the object sought to be attained.7  In the instant case, the purpose
of the legislation was the protection of public health, but the require-
ment of two years' citizenship bore no relationship to that purpose
and was therefore violative of the due process clause. Although laws
enacted pursuant to the police power have a strong presumption of
validity,8 where the conflict between the legislative enactment and the
Constitution is plain and unmistakable, the courts will act to declare
the enactment unconstitutional.9 The equal protection clause does not
prohibit reasonable classification. 10 However, since the classification
in the instant case was clearly arbitrary and discriminatory, the legis-
lation, as plaintiff contends, was also violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. The due process and equal protection
clauses apply to all persons within the jurisdiction whether citizens
or aliens." Therefore, both petitioners are entitled to the relief
sought.' 2
C. McC.
6 People v. Ringe, 197 N. Y. 143, 90 N. E. 451 (1910).
7 People v. Saltis, 328 Ill. 494, 160 N. E. 86 (1927) ; Moore v. Northern
Kentucky Independent Food Dealers Ass'n, 286 Ky. 24, 149 S. W. (2d) 755(1941); Noyes v. Erie and Wyoming Farmers Co-operative Corp., 281 N. Y.
187, 22 N. E. (2d) 334 (1939); Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N. Y. 271,
94 N. E. 431 (1911).8 People v. Henry, 131 Cal. App. 82, 21 P. (2d) 672 (1933); EXv parte
Ruppe, 80 Cal. App. 629, 252 Pac. 746 (1927); People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270,
182 N. E. 439 (1932).
9 State v. Childs, 32 Ariz. 222, 257 Pac. 366 (1927) ; Van Camp Sea Food
Co. v. Newbert, 76 Cal. App. 445, 244 Pac. 946 (1926); Talbott v. Thomas,
286 Ky. 786, 151 S. W. (2d) 1 "(1941).
10 Whitney v. People of the State of California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct.
641 (1927); Little v. American State Bank of Dearborn, 263 Mich. 645, 249N. W. 22 (1933); Lowry v. City of Clarksdale, 154 Miss. 155, 122 So. 195(1929); State v. First State Bank of Alliance, 122 Neb. 109, 239 N. W. 646(1931); Barns v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Ass'n, 220 App. Div. 624,
222 N. Y. Supp. 294 (4th Dep't 1927).
11 Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7 (1915) ; Universal Adjust-
ment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., of London, England, 281 Mass. 303, 184
N. E. 152 (1933).
12 Commissioner of Licenses, Moss, was directed by the court to accept the
applications of petitioners and to allow them to take the examination for
licenses.
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